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Abstract
This study investigates whether block acquisitions lead to changes in board and
CEO compensation characteristics and finds that block purchasers do not play a
significant role in improving the firm’s governance practices. However, the majority of
professional investors have sold their block within a year, suggesting that they do not
own their stock long enough to alter governance policies nor to benefit from such
changes. For the smaller number of firms where a new blockholder maintains their
investment for more than a year, the use of equity based CEO compensation increases
while the use of cash based compensation decreases.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent scandals at Enron, Global Crossing, Aldephia, Qwest and World Com
have led the pundits to declare a crisis in corporate governance and to call for greater
vigilance by regulators and analysts of board practices, CEO compensation, and auditor
independence.1 Shareholder activists also have called upon major stockholders
(blockholders), such as mutual funds and money managers, to play a more active role in
determining the practices of corporate governance. They have argued that money
managers’ lack of concern for board independence and CEO compensation have
contributed to the crisis in corporate governance.2

Prior research suggests that major

investors do influence corporate policy by replacing the CEO and by restructuring the
corporation after their purchase of a block of stock (see Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler,
1998; and Denis and Serrano, 1996; and Barclay and Holderness, 1991). These actions
can be taken quickly and their impact can be reflected almost immediately in the price of
the stock. No study to date has investigated whether actions that have longer run
impacts, such as changes in the independence and effectiveness of the board or changes
in the incentive compensation of the CEO, also occur after a block acquisition by a
professional investor. This study does and finds most such blockholders simply do not
hold their stock long enough to have either the ability or incentive to make longer run
changes in the corporation in which they just acquired stock.

1

See “How to Fix Corporate Governance,” Special Report- The Crisis in Corporate
Governance, BusinessWeek, New York, New York, May 6, 2002.
2
See “Investors of the world, unite!” Fortune, New York, New York, June 24, 2002.
1
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1569-3732(04)09004-8). Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

In a sample of 159 block acquisitions for 92 firms for 1989 and 1990,
restructurings and the replacement of the CEO increase significantly after an acquisition
of a block of stock by an outside investor, a finding consistent with prior studies. There
is only weak evidence, however, that the actions of the blockholders lead to greater use of
incentive compensation for the CEO. Furthermore, the results for the changes in CEO
compensation are strongest for those firms where a new blockholder maintains their
investment in the firm for more than a year. There is no evidence that block acquisitions
result in a change in the composition of the board or its effectiveness. Foregoing these
longer run actions is consistent with this study’s findings that almost half of the new
blockholders have sold their stake in less than a year after their initial purchase and over
70% have done so within two years. These results support complaints in the financial
press that large institutional holders, mutual fund, and other managers fail to influence
corporate governance policies in most firms.
One reason that these investors may not choose to strengthen the effectiveness of
the board and CEO compensation contracts is the time required to effect such changes.
Given the size of their investment, blockholders may not be willing to wait to make
changes that will lead to an increase in stock price. Most existing compensation
contracts are re-negotiated annually and, in some cases with long-term performance
plans, even less frequently. Thus a new blockholder may have to wait until the contract
is up for re-negotiation to make changes in the incentives for the existing CEO.
Board changes are also “sticky.” Routine changes in board composition can be
made only when stockholders elect directors at the annual meeting. Management largely
controls the nominating process and thus a blockholder can only put forth a competing
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slate of nominees by instigating a proxy fight. Furthermore, blockholders often lose the
fight because shareholders with small holdings tend to vote with management. Thus
blockholders may not get the board they want even if they are willing to wait until the
annual meeting and wage a proxy fight.3
In contrast, a large blockholder can effect changes in the CEO and the firm’s
restructuring plans relatively quickly. They can pressure the board into making these
changes by using the voting power inherent in their position as large shareholders to
implicitly convey their willingness to align themselves with potential bidders in a
takeover or other dissident shareholders.4 In fact, many researchers have found that
outside block acquisitions occur prior to an eventual takeover suggesting that
management and the board will find such a threat credible (see Mikkelson and Ruback,
1985; Holderness and Sheehan, 1986; Barclay and Holderness, 1991; Denis and Serrano,
1996; and Peck, 1996). This tacit threat together with ‘quiet pressure’ can cause the
board and the top managers to focus on changes such as replacing the CEO or
restructuring the firm that do not require a shareholder vote (see Shleifer and Vishny,
1986, and Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1998). 5

3

See Dodd and Warner (1983) and “How Shareholder Votes are Legally Rigged,”
BusinessWeek, New York, New York, May 20, 2002.
4
Alignment can either take the form of tendering their shares to the bidder or voting
with the bidder at a special meeting of shareholders called to vote on the takeover/
merger.
5
Furthermore, CEO replacement and restructuring may lead to greater increases in
shareholder value than changes in corporate governance policies. Thus blockholders may
be more likely to target firms that are candidates for CEO replacement than firms that are
candidates for corporate governance changes. The difference in the increase in
shareholder wealth from these two types of changes (if any) is not addressed in this study,
but the timing is. See the discussion of this study’s limitations in the last section of the
paper.
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These findings are consistent with the arguments made by Maug (1998)- that
when the stock market is relatively liquid, large shareholders have less incentive to
monitor managers. It is more profitable for such investors to acquire a block large enough
to pressure managers to make quick changes to increase share value and then sell their
block, which, in turn, frees up capital to repeat the strategy. A liquid stock market, such
as that in the United States, allows for investors to pursue such a strategy.
This study makes three contributions. First, the findings of this study contribute
to our understanding of the lack of blockholder activism. Prior researchers have
investigated the rationale of the activism by public pension funds ( Romano, 1993;
Murphy and Van Nuys, 1994; Wahal, 1996; Karpoff, Malatesta and Walking, 1996;
Smith, 1996; Gillan and Starks, 1998; and Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1998). Del Guercio
and Hawkins (1998) suggest that the strategies of institutional investors drive the form
their activism takes. They show that because many public pension funds are indexed,
publicly targeting a particular firm included in the index to improve its performance
induces other firms included in that index to make changes to avoid also becoming a
target.
Money managers and mutual fund mangers that actively manage their portfolios
do not have these same incentives. Since they can buy and sell stocks freely without the
constraints of indexing, the performance of their portfolios may be enhanced by making
quick changes that immediately improve the stock price on their announcement such as
the replacement of the CEO and the restructuring of assets. In contrast, changes that take
longer to implement, such as increasing board independence and effectiveness, will show
up in higher stock value only after a significant time lag. The criticism that professional
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investors are not active in determining corporate governance practices ignores the nature
of their in-and -out investment strategies. These give such investors little incentive or
ability to take actions that pay-off in the long run.
Second, this paper suggests that the length of time a buyer maintains block
ownership in a firm is critical to observing changes in firm policies following a block
acquisition. No study to date (see Holderness, 2003) has examined how the duration of
block ownership impacts changes in firm policy and firm value. The results in this paper
show that such changes are positively correlated with the length of time the investor
holds a block. Third, this paper adds to previous research on the role that blockholders
play in changing CEO compensation. While prior researchers have looked at how the
structure of CEO compensation varies with the structure of equity ownership (Mehran,
1995), researchers have not examined whether changes in ownership structure cause
changes in CEO compensation. This study does and finds that when a new outside
investor owns a block for more than a year, the board is pressured to increase equity
based compensation and decrease total cash payments to the CEO.
The next section of this paper describes the sample and data and follows with a
section that reports descriptive characteristics of the block acquisitions. Subsequent
sections report the results on changes in the firm around block acquisitions and
investigates the new blockholders’ holding period. The last section concludes with a
discussion of the study’s limitations and suggestions for future research.
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SAMPLE AND DATA
Data on blockholders, defined as the ownership of 5% or more of a public
corporation’s shares, must meet the Securities and Exchange Commission requirements for
disclosure. An individual investor or corporation acquiring a block of stock must file a 13D
within 10 days of reaching the 5% threshold. The filing must state whether or not the
acquisition is for the purpose of changing or influencing the control of the firm.
Subsequent one percent changes in ownership interests require an amended 13D. In
contrast, institutional investors who become blockholders in the ordinary course of their
business and with no intention of changing or influencing control of the firm need only
file the simpler 13G form. This study investigates only 13D block acquisitions because
such blockholders are more likely to attempt to change the firm’s corporate governance
than those filing a 13G form.
Barron's, weekly publication, lists all new 13D filings as well as their
amendments from the previous week. A sample of 665 13D filings is obtained from the
Barron's issues July 3, 1989 to May 28, 1990. To be included in the sample, the firm
whose stock is being acquired must have a CUSIP so that accounting data that can be
collected from Compustat. This requirement reduces the final sample to 386 filings for
252 firms. Also excluded from the sample were 58 13D filings in which the purchaser
could not be identified (sales of blocks). Finally, proxy statements must be available for
one year prior to the block acquisition and two years afterwards to identify changes in the
composition in the board and compensation of the CEO. This last requirement reduces
the sample to 156 transactions of block acquisitions involving 92 different firms. One
hundred and two of these acquisitions were made in 1989 and 54 in 1990.
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The notation for the years surrounding the block acquisition is –1, 0,+1, +2, with
0 representing the year for the proxy closest to the block acquisition date. Year –1, +1,
+2 represent the years before and after the block acquisition. While the data for year 0 is
reported, the potential for reporting lags for this year led to its exclusion from statistical
tests. Hypothesis tests center around changes in the proxy data from year –1 to years +1
and +2.
Data on CEO compensation includes the CEO's common stock ownership,
common stock options granted and total cash compensation. Since the SEC does not
require firms to report salary and cash bonuses separately, not all firms in the sample
have this information and thus it is not used in tests of changes in CEO incentive
compensation. Data on board compensation includes the number of directors and the
percentage of outside directors, defined as those with no obvious ties to management.
These are non-management directors that exclude retired managers of the firm; members
of management’s family; banks, lawyers, accountants, trustees, and other business
professionals that have a business relationship with management as disclosed in the proxy
statement. Compustat provides operating income before depreciation and amortization,
EBITDA (item #13), total assets (item #6) and total sales (item #12). Finally, The Wall
Street Journal Company Summary News Index identifies events related to takeovers,
restructurings, and shareholder dissidence for the 12 months prior to the block acquisition
and the 12 months afterwards.
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TYPE OF INVESTOR, SIZE OF BLOCK, AND METHOD OF ACQUISITION
I follow Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler (1998) in my classification scheme of
types of outside investors that purchase a 5% or greater block. Blockholders are
classified as either activist, financial, or strategic. Activist blockholders are those
identified by Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler (1998), Denis and Serrano (1996), and Peck
(1996) and include “raiders” such as Victor Posner, equity holding companies such as
Gabelli Funds, and individuals such as Fayez F. Sarofim. Financial blockholders are
defined as banks, pension funds, non-bank trusts, insurance companies and brokerage
firms. Strategic blockholders are miscellaneous corporations such as Archer Daniels
Midland Company.
Table 1 reports the type of investors making block acquisitions. The majority of
investors making acquisitions are activist blockholders, followed by financial and then
strategic buyers. These results are similar to those found by Bethel, Liebeskind, and
Opler (1998) indicating that the sample has the usual collection of blockholders.
Furthermore, to the extent that most of the blockholders in the sample have been
characterized as activists elsewhere suggests that our sample has a significant
representation of those blockholders that would be most active in corporate governance
issues.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Table 1 also reports how the blocks are acquired because the method of acquisition
in the sample could explain the results. For example, if most of the acquisitions are
negotiated trades, then the selling blockholder may have already instituted corporate
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governance changes. The method of acquiring the block is defined by the dates of the
acquisition and the identity of the seller (in the case of negotiated trades) reported by
Barron’s from the information in the 13D. A negotiated acquisition (about 5% of the
sample) is defined as one in which an intact block is transferred from one investor to
another. We defined a “block” trade (8% of the sample) as one in which the seller is not
identified but the acquisition occurs within one day. In these transactions, it is likely that a
larger block is assembled from several smaller ones (see Madhavan and Cheng, 1997). An
open market accumulation is defined as one in which there is no identifiable seller and the
acquisition takes more than one day. These are the majority (87.18%) of the block
acquisitions and on average take between 4 and 5 weeks to complete. Thus most of the
block acquisitions in the sample represent newly created blocks and reflect a major increase
in concentration in outside share ownership. Thus pre-existing outside blockholders are
unlikely to have eliminated opportunities to change the firm’s corporate governance
practices.
Finally, Table 1 reports the size of the block acquired. The typical size is between
10 and 14% depending on the type of investor. Again, the size is comparable to other
studies reporting block size (see Denis and Serrano, 1996; and Peck, 1996). Thus it is
unlikely that the sample includes smaller than usual block purchases leading to lesser
incentives for acquirers to change corporate governance practices.
In summary, the type of investors, size of block, and method of acquisition are
comparable to those reported by other studies of block acquisitions. Thus there is
nothing unusual in the type of block acquisitions in the sample that may provide an
explanation for the lack of changes in corporate governance after a block acquisition.
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CHANGES IN THE FIRM AFTER A BLOCK ACQUISITION
The next sections report: (1) the events that occurred after the new blockholder
became a shareholder such as takeovers, restructuring activity, and shareholder
dissidence; (2) the replacement of the CEO and changes in the structure of the CEO’s
compensation; and (3) the changes in the board of directors.

Significant Events
Table 2 reports the events that occur in the year before and after a block acquisition
for all block acquisitions in the sample by different types of investors. It shows that there is
considerable takeover activity around block acquisitions. Takeover activity includes
takeovers that are attempted as well as rumors of impending ones. Other researchers also
have found that block acquisitions occur during takeover activity for a variety of reasons:
to acquire a “toehold” prior to a takeover attempt (see Mikkelson and Ruback, 1985; and
Holderness and Sheehan, 1986); to facilitate improvements in firms with failed takeovers
(see Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler, 1998; and Denis and Serrano, 1996); or to facilitate
transfers of control (see Peck, 1996). Table 2 also shows that there is no significant
difference in the level of such activity after the acquisition among the various types of
investors. This is to be expected since the sample excludes firms that were successfully
acquired and no longer report as independent firms board composition or CEO
compensation.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
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Table 2 also reports changes in the frequency of restructuring activity defined as
spin offs, acquisitions, joint ventures or acquisitions of a large blocks of stock in another
company, layoffs, or the closing of units/ plants, and the sales of business units. Table 2
shows that the frequency of restructuring activity increases significantly after a block
acquisition and occurs largely after the acquisition of a block by an active investor. Such
investors, which include “raiders” with the reputation of sometimes taking over a
company, are more likely to pressure management to restructure the operations of the
corporations. These findings are consistent with those of Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler
(1998) who also report an increase in restructuring events after the purchase of a block by
an active investor. Table 2 shows that a significant increase in restructuring activity
occurs with strategic investors. This is to be expected as strategic investors cause the
firm to strategically realign its assets.
Table 2 also reports any dissident activity by shareholders such as bringing a
lawsuit against management or waging a proxy fight. Table 2 shows that these events
occur less often than either takeover rumors or attempts at restructurings. This finding is
consistent with reports in the financial press that other than public pension funds, most
professional investors are not activists in matters of corporate governance.

Replacement of the CEO and Changes in CEO Compensation
Table 3 reports the frequency with which the CEO is replaced and changes in the
CEO compensation package after the block acquisition. Table 3 shows that the frequency
with which CEOs are replaced is significantly higher in the year following the block
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acquisition. These results hold for acquisitions by active and financial investors but not for
strategic investors. Again these results are similar to those of Bethel, Liebeskind, and
Opler, 1998; Denis and Serrano, 1996; and Barclay and Holderness, 1991.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

The replacement of the CEO is also likely to provide an opportunity to restructure
the CEO’s compensation contract. Thus blockholders may not only be involved in
removing a poorly performing CEO but also improving a poorly structured compensation
contract. Table 3 shows the number of options granted to the CEO as a percentage of the
stock outstanding increase in the year following the block acquisition. The increase in
stock option grants occurs largely with acquisitions by financial investors as does the
significant increase in the percentage of stock held by the CEO.
Two conclusions can be drawn from this finding. First, because approximately
only a third of the block acquisitions (48 financial buyers out of 156 total) are associated
with a significant increase in stock based compensation it is unlikely that the observed
increase for the financial buyers reflects a general trend towards more equity based
compensation. Second, and more importantly, it suggests that blockholder activism takes
different forms depending on the type of blockholder. In the previous section, it is shown
that restructuring activities are more likely to take place when the blockholder is either an
active or strategic investor; financial buyers do not appear to increase the amount of firm
restructuring. However, they apparently do put pressure to have CEO compensation
contracts to include more option grants.
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Various correlated omitted variables are explored to determine whether the firms
in which financial buyers that purchase blocks of stock are different than those of other
investors and whether these differences may be the underlying causes of the observed
changes towards the CEO compensation that is more stock based. Differences in firm
size (total assets and total sales), firm performance (EBITDA/ total assets and EBITDA/
total sales), and CEO compensation between block acquisitions by financial investors and
all other investors are reported in Table 4.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

The table shows that the average size of total assets in year –1 for firms where
financial investors acquire a stake is $694 million versus $1794 million for all other
blockholders, a difference statistically significant at the 5% level. Clearly financial
investors focus on smaller firms. Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler (1998) find that active
blockholders purchase stakes in larger, more diversified firms where there are greater
opportunities to increase share value by restructuring the firm’s assets. They find no
evidence of such activity by financial buyers but they do observe an increase in ROA
following an acquisition by a financial buyer. They conclude that financial buyers
perhaps engage in “quiet diplomacy” to improve a firm’s performance. This study
provides evidence that shows that financial buyers’ “quiet diplomacy” takes the form of
pressuring the board to change the CEO’s compensation package to include more equity
based incentives.
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Alternatively, size may reflect that financial buyers acquire stock in smaller
growth oriented firms. Table 4 also shows that EBITDA/ total sales is on average higher
in years 0 and +1 at the 5% and 10% level respectively for firms with financial buyers
than all other firms. The spurt in the return on sales suggests these firms may have been
smaller ones poised for higher growth. Table 4 also shows that total cash compensation
as a percentage of total assets is also statistically significant less for firms with financial
buyers than all other firms. Growth firms tend also to compensate CEOs with less cash
and more equity based incentives than mature ones (see Smith and Watts,1992). Thus the
possibility that financial buyers invest in small growth firms that coincidentally increase
the CEO’s stock and stock option awards cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, as discussed
later, most financial buyers have divested within a year, making the likelihood that the
increase in the CEO’s stock based compensation is the result of pressure from these
blockholders less plausible.

Changes in the Board
Another important way that blockholders can improve the corporate governance of the
firm is by making the board more independent. Prior researchers have shown that a higher
percentage of outside directors on the board leads to better monitoring of management (see
Weisbach, 1988; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Shivdasani, 1993;
Brickley, Coles, and Terry, 1994; and Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner, 1997). One way
that blockholders can improve the independence monitoring function of the board is to
pressure the existing board to add more outsiders. Table 5 reports the change in the
percentage of outsiders that are on the board around block acquisitions. The results show
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that there are no statistically significant changes either for the entire sample of block
acquisitions or any of the sub-samples of investor types. Yermack (1996) has shown that
smaller boards are more effective. Another way then that blockholders can improve the
board is to reduce the number of directors. Table 5 also shows changes in the number of
directors around block acquisitions. There are no statistically significant changes for the
entire sample of block acquisitions. Only the median number of directors is significantly
smaller at the 10% level after the acquisition by a financial investor. The findings reported
in Table 5 suggest that for the most part outside blockholders do not seek to change the
board of directors, a result consistent with earlier discussion of the obstacles to making
longer run changes in corporate governance practices.

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

An alternative explanation is that blockholders tend to purchase blocks in
companies that already have well functioning boards and no changes are warranted.
Yermack (1996) finds that firm value is highest for most firms when board size is between
4 and 8 directors. Table 5 shows that the typical number of directors in the sample is at the
upper end of this range. Table 5 also shows that the average board has a majority of
outside directors and is likely to be already functioning independent of the CEO.
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HOW LONG DO BLOCKHOLDERS STAY AND WHAT ARE THE
CONSEQUENCES OF LONGER-TERM INVESTMENTS?
As discussed earlier, one reason that shareholder activism may not take the form of
changes in CEO compensation or in the membership of the board is because most
professional investors do not own their block long enough to exert pressure on the firm to
make these changes or to benefit from them. To investigate this hypothesis, Table 6 reports
the number of investors that continue to own a block one and two years after the initial
acquisition. Whether the investor continues to own a block or not is determined by
whether the shareholder continues to be listed on the firm’s proxy statement as a 5% or
more blockholder for years +1 and +2.

TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

Table 6 shows that by the end of year +1 only half of all investors continue to own a 5%
block. By the second year, this had declined to less than a third. Financial investors are the
quickest to sell their blocks- only 25% continue to maintain their investment a year later
and only 18% continue their ownership in the firm in the following year. These findings
suggest that financial buyers are more likely to acquire stakes in order to capitalize on
quick gains. This conclusion is consistent with the evidence in Table 4 that shows that
financial buyers tend to invest in firms that are smaller with a spurt in growth.
Active and strategic buyers maintain their ownership longer. By the end of the second
year, 41% of strategic and 28% of active investors still have an ownership stake in the
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firm. Strategic and active buyers’ interests are more likely to be long term compared to
financial investors that are more likely to be looking for faster returns to their capital.
Table 6 shows that most investors do not continue to hold their block for long
enough to effect changes in the firm’s corporate governance practices. What about the
smaller number of investors that hold their blocks for longer than a year? Table 7 shows
the changes in the structure of CEO compensation and board characteristics for investors
that continue to own their block in the firm for at least a year. These results suggest that
CEO compensation becomes more equity and less cash based and the board becomes
more independent when blockholders continue to maintain their investment in the firm.

TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE

Table 7 shows that in firms where active buyers continue to own a block the CEO
is more likely to change and the percentage of options granted increases. However,
offsetting the incentive effects from an increase in options grants is a decline in stock
ownership. Yet, it is likely that as the CEO is granted more options, he or she decreases
their stock ownership to diversify their holdings. Furthermore, stock holdings are also
indicative of past options and stock awards as well as the current structure of the CEO’s
compensation. Table 7 also shows that the percentage of outside directors on the board
increases and that the CEO’s total cash compensation decreases when strategic buyers
maintain their block ownership in the firm. A decline in cash compensation can reflect a
decrease in salary and a move to more equity based compensation. Even though the
changes in equity based compensation are not statistically significant, Table 7 shows that
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the average percentage of options granted increases for these firms in the sample. While
not reported in the table, no statistically significant changes are found for the 12 firms
where financial buyers maintain their ownership in the firm for one year. Nor are there
any statistically significant changes found in CEO compensation or board characteristics
for firms where active or strategic buyers sold their block within a year.
Of course, changes in firm size and performance can confound the findings
reported in Table 7. For example, total cash compensation can decline because the firm’s
accounting earnings have declined leading to a lower accounting based cash bonus.
Table 8 reports the results of a logit regression that seeks to explain a buyer’s decision to
maintain their block ownership in the firm and includes corporate governance
characteristics as well as measures of firm size and performance. The independent
variables in the year before the block acquisition are included since these are likely to
influence the level of the independent variables in the year after the block acquisition.6 In
addition, a dummy variable for a change in the CEO in year +1 is included since Farrell
and Whidbee (2000) show that CEO changes often lead to changes in the board and
changes in the CEO can lead to a restructuring of compensation contracts.

TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE

6

Alternatively, the percentage change in these variables could be used as explanatory
variables. They are not used since these variables tend to exacerbate the statistical
problems created by outliers. For example, a small absolute change in the percentage of
options granted can lead to a very large percentage change when the initial level of the
options granted is close to zero.
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The results in Table 8 show that blockholders are more likely to maintain their
investment when cash compensation is lower and the percentage of options granted is
higher. These findings suggest that CEO compensation is more likely to become more
equity and less cash based when investors continue to hold a block in the firm for more
than a year. These changes are likely to increase the CEO’s incentives to increase
shareholder value. Surprisingly, board size and independence is not significantly related
to a buyer’s decision to maintain their block holdings for more than a year. However, as
mentioned earlier, it is likely that blockholders invest in companies that have well
functioning boards that will facilitate their efforts to change the structure of the CEO’s
compensation.

CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
This study documents that restructuring and CEO replacements increase
significantly after a block acquisition; findings already documented by other researchers.
This study extends their results by investigating whether block acquisitions also lead to
changes in CEO compensation and board characteristics, important dimensions of the
firm’s governance practices. The overall pattern of results indicates that purchasers of a
block do not play a significant role in improving the independence and effectiveness of
the board or increasing the amount of incentive compensation for the CEO. The study
also documents that the majority of professional investors have sold their block within a
year. This short holding period suggests that professional owners do not own their stock
for a long enough period to alter governance policies that require a stockholder’s vote at
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the annual meeting. Nor do blockholders hold their shares long enough to benefit from
these changes. We do find, however, that for some firms where investors do maintain
their block ownership for more than a year, that CEO compensation becomes less cash
and more equity based.
There are two major limitations to the study that provide opportunities for
additional research. First, a sample of block acquisitions is used and not a more random
sample. A random sample could address additional questions raised by the results of this
study. What firm characteristics attract a blockholder and cause an investor to maintain
their block holdings or cause an investor to sell? What is the interaction between the type
of blockholder, duration of investment, and the nature of the change in the firm’s
corporate governance policies and restructuring activities? What is the magnitude of the
change in shareholder value associated with different types of changes in these policies?
These questions can be answered only with a large random sample of firms that includes
a broad cross-section of firms with and without a block acquisition and that tracks
changes in corporate governance polices, restructuring activities, and other firm
characteristics over a long period of time. The results in this study suggest that such an
undertaking is worth while and may lead to additional insights into the ways that different
types of blockholders influence the firm’s corporate governance polices.
A second limitation of the study is that the sample is more than 10 years old.

A

disadvantage to using an older sample is that the results may not reflect current business
conditions and in particular recent pressures for corporate reform. However, there are
two advantages to using an older sample. First, the time period of the sample is
consistent with that used in many of the important prior studies of blockholders so that
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the results are comparable (see Holderness, 2003). This comparison is particularly
important to ensure that the results of the study are not driven by something unusual
about the sample. Second, because corporate reforms have been only enacted recently, it
will be some time before there is sufficient data available to test the impact of these
reforms. In the mean time, our study examines the extent to which blockholders
influence changes in the firm’s corporate governance policies without such reforms. This
provides a useful benchmark against which the effect of new reforms on blockholders’
behavior can be compared when more data becomes available.
However, current proposals are unlikely to lead to different findings. In 2003, the
SEC proposed a new rule to make it easier for long-term large shareholders to nominate
directors to the board.7 The hope is that greater shareholder involvement in the creation
of the board will lead to improvement in it’s oversight function. Yet, the findings of this
study suggest that the SEC’s proposal will yield, at best, only marginal improvements in
corporate governance practices. This study has shown that the majority of large
shareholders are not long term investors and consequently the SEC’s proposal will not
apply to them. Corporate reform, then, is unlikely to come from professional money
managers since their investment strategy does not give them sufficient incentives to press
for longer run changes in the firm’s corporate governance practices. Reformers of
corporate practices need to seek their support for the changes they hope to have adopted
from other institutions and groups. The exceptions may be the very large public pension
funds such as that of California or New York City that are large enough to capture the
spillover from improvements and have commitments to public policy objectives.
7

See “SEC proposal would give voice to shareholders in board nominations,”
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, October 9, 2003.
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Incentives, such as tax savings, are needed to encourage money managers to make longterm block ownership part of their investment strategy. Otherwise, the rank and file of
professional investors is likely to remain in the bleachers in the battle over corporate
governance.
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Table 1: Type of Investors and Method of Acquisition for a Sample of 156 blocks for 92
firms from 1989-1990.
Type of Investor a:
Active

Financial

Strategic

TOTAL

Negotiated
Trade

0

0

7

7
(4.49%)

Block

3

4

6

13
(8.33%)

Open Market
Accumulation

64

44

28

136
(87.18%)

Average time to
accumulate block
(median)
(calendar days)

35.97
(34)

40.36
(31)

36.13
(32.5)

38.48
(34)

Average size of
Block
(median)
(percentage of
shares
outstanding)

12.08%
(9.99%)

12.71%
(10.545%)

14.06%
(11.22%)

12.79%
(10.33)

TOTAL

67
(42.95%)

48
(30.77%)

41
(26.28%)

156
(100%)

Method of
Acquisition b:

a

Activist blockholders are those identified by Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler (1998),
Denis and Serrano (1996), and Peck (1996) and include “raiders” such as Victor Posner,
equity holding companies such as Gabelli Funds, and individuals such as Fayez F.
Sarofim. My results do not change when I separate these three groups. Financial
blockholders are defined as banks, pension funds, and brokerage firms. Strategic
blockholders are miscellaneous corporations such as Archer Daniels Midland Company.
b

A negotiated is defined as one in which an intact block is transferred from one investor
to another. A block trade is defined as one in which a seller is not identified but the
acquisition occurs within one day. An open market accumulation is defined as one in
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which there is no identifiable seller and the acquisition takes more than one day to
complete.
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Table 2: Changes in the Frequency of Firm Events for a Sample of 156 blocks for 92
firms from 1989-1990.
Year –1

Year +1 a

Takeover attempt or rumor

20

33

Shareholders sue management
or wage a proxy fight

8

13

Restructuring b

42

79***

Takeover attempt or rumor

8

18*

Shareholders sue management
or wage a proxy fight

0

5

Restructuring

12

35***

Takeover attempt or rumor

6

9

Shareholders sue management
or wage a proxy fight

1

4

Restructuring

23

26

Takeover attempt or rumor

6

6

Shareholders sue management
or wage a proxy fight

7

4

Restructuring

7

18***

All Block Acquisitions:

Active Investors:
(n=67)

Financial Investors:
(n=48)

Strategic Investors:
(n=41)
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*** = statistically significant at the 1% level.
**= statistically significant at the 5% level.
*= statistically significant at the 10% level.
a

Chi-square test is used to test changes in frequency of events in year –1 to year +1.
A restructuring includes spin offs, acquisitions, joint ventures, acquisitions of a large
blocks of stock in another company, layoffs, or the closing of units/ plants, sales of
business units.
b
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Table 3: Changes in Frequency of CEO Replacement and Average Compensation
Characteristics for a Sample of 156 blocks for 92 firms from 1989-1990 (medians
reported in parenthesis).
Year –1

Year 0

Year +1

Year +2 a

0.36%
(0.15%)

0.36%
(0.17%)

0.35%
(0.14%)

0.42%
(0.33%)

Percentage of
Options

0.21%
(0.06%)

0.24%
(0.04%)

0.35%
(0.08%)

0.42%***
(0.11%)

Percentage of
Stock

6.75%
(3.11%)

6.92%
(2.88%)

8.10%
(2.86%)

7.43%
(3.25%)

3.21%

19.23%

13.46%***

Total Cash
All Block
Acquisitions: Compensation
as a
Percentage of
Total Assets

Percentage of
CEO replaced
from prior
year
Active
Investors:
(n=67)

Total Cash
Compensation
as a
Percentage of
Total Assets

0.39%
(0.14%)

0.47%
(0.17%)

0.50%
(0.13%)

0.65%
(0.14%)

Percentage of
Options

0.26%
(0.02%)

0.16%
(0%)

0.23%
(0.08%)

0.29%
(0.11%)

Percentage of
Stock

7.02%
(4.25%)

6.47%
(3.54%)

7.80%
(2.79%)

6.81%
(2.96%)

0%

19.40%

10.45%***

0.16%
(0.13%)

0.19%
(0.14%)

0.19%
(0.11%)

Percentage of
CEO replaced
from prior
year
Financial
Investors:
(n=48)

Total Cash
Compensation
as a
Percentage of
Total Assets

0.17%
(0.15%)
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Percentage of
Options

0.18%
(0.05%)

0.20%
(0.05%)

0.37%
(0.12%)

0.58%***
(0.12%**)

Percentage of
Stock

7.41%
(1.98%)

7.17%
(2.44%)

8.23%
(3.61%)

8.66%
(3.77%**)

0%

16.67%

22.92%***

Percentage of
CEO replaced
from prior
year
Strategic
Investors:
(n=41)

Total Cash
Compensation
as a
Percentage of
Total Assets

0.54%
(0.23%)

0.41%
(0.17%)

0.29%
(0.16%)

0.36%
(0.17%)

Percentage of
Options

0.18%
(0.12%)

0.44%
(0.10%)

0.52%
(0.05%)

0.40%
(0.08%)\

Percentage of
Stock

5.50%
(1.43%)

7.37%
(2.44%)

8.11%
(1.24%)

6.80%
(0.84%)

12.20%

21.95%

7.32%

Percentage of
CEO replaced
from prior
year

*** = statistically significant at the 1% level.
**= statistically significant at the 5% level.
*= statistically significant at the 10% level.
a

A standard t-test is used to test for a significant difference in means between year –1
and year +2. A Wilcoxon Sum Rank test is used to test for a significant difference in
medians between year –1 and year +2. The samples are tested for unequal variances and
then the appropriate standard t-test or Satterthwaite adjusted t-test is used depending on
the outcome of the test for unequal variances. A chi-square test is used to test for a
significant difference in the frequency of CEO replacements in years 0, +1, and +2.
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Table 4: Differences in Average Selected Firm Characteristics for Financial Investors
versus All other Investors for a Sample of 156 blocks for 92 firms from 1989-1990
(medians reported in parenthesis).
Year –1

Year 0

Year +1

Year +2

Financial
Investors

$694.15**
($528.28)

$775.37**
($485.47)

$795.00*
($398.84)

$805.54** a
($323.55)

All Other
Investors

$1, 793.61
($292.76)

$1, 847.04
($295.59)

$1, 943.51
($292.51)

$2, 053.45
($314.78)

Financial
Investors

$651.31
($250.83)

$702.73
($267.50)

$711.99
($297.56)

$733.87
($297.54)

All Other
Investors

$1, 227.28
($355.83)

$1, 295.16
($329.51)

$1, 395.99
($383.96)

$1, 450.88
($410.90)

Financial
Investors

0.05
(0.05)**

0.11
(0.08)

0.07
(0.07)

0.05
(0.08)

All Other
Investors

0.09
(0.09)

0.08
(0.05)

0.06
(0.06)

0.05
(0.07)

Financial
Investors

0.05
(0.07)

0.36**
(0.07)

0.19*
(0.07)

0.07
(0.08)

All Other
Investors

0.06
(0.07)

0.09
(0.04)

0.06
(0.04)

0.06
(0.05)

Total Cash
Compensation
as a
Percentage of
Total Assets

Financial
Investors

0.17%***
(0.15%)

0.16%***
(0.13%)

0.19%**
(0.14%)

0.19%**
(0.11%)

All Other
Investors

0.44%
(0.16%)

0.45%
(0.17%)

0.42%
(0.15%)

0.54%
(0.17%)

Percentage of
Options

Financial
Investors

0.18%
(0.05%)

0.20%
(0.05%)

0.37%
(0.12%)

0.58%
(0.12%*)

All Other
Investors

0.23%
(0.07%)

0.26%
(0.02%)

0.34%
(0.07%)

0.33%
(0.10%)

Financial
Investors

7.41%
(1.98%)

7.17%
(2.44%)

8.23%
(3.61%)

8.66%
(3.77%**)

All Other

6.46%

6.81%

7.91%

6.80%

Total Assets
(millions $)

Total Sales
(millions $)

EBITDA/
Total Assets

EBITDA/
Total Sales

Percentage of
Stock
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Investors

(4.10%)

(3.44%)

(2.40%)

(2.08%)

*** = statistically significant at the 1% level.
**= statistically significant at the 5% level.
*= statistically significant at the 10% level.
a

A standard t-test is used to test for a significant difference in means between financial
and all other investors for each year. A Wilcoxon Sum Rank test is used to test for a
significant difference in medians for each year. The samples are tested for unequal
variances and then the appropriate standard t-test or Satterthwaite adjusted t-test is used
depending on the outcome of the test for unequal variances.
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Table 5: Changes in Average Board Composition and Size for a Sample of 156 blocks
for 92 firms from 1989-1990 (medians reported in parenthesis).

All Block
Acquisitions:

Active
Investors:
(n=67)

Financial
Investors:
(n=48)

Strategic
Investors:
(n=41)

Year –1

Year 0

Year +1

Year +2

Total
number of
directors

8.63
(8)

8.37
(8.5)

8.48
(8)

8.53 a
(8)

Percentage
of outside
directors

62.09%
(66.67%)

63.36%
(66.67%)

63.97%
(66.67%)

64.70%
(66.67%)

Total
number of
directors

8.46
(7.5)

8.87
(8)

8.80
(8)

8.97
(9)

Percentage
of outside
directors

63.11%
(66.67%)

63.13%
(66.67%)

63.22%
(66.67%)

64.12%
(66.67%)

Total
number of
directors

8.73
(9)

8.63
(8.5)

8.02
(8)

7.9
(8) *

Percentage
of outside
directors

65.04%
(63.96%)

65.35%
(62.5%)

65.77%
(61.54%)

67.45%
(67.86%)

Total
number of
directors

8.80
(9)

8.68
(9)

8.5
(8)

8.66
(8.5)

Percentage
of outside
directors

56.89%
(58.33%)

61.41%
(66.67%)

63.05%
(72.08%)

62.02%
(72.08%)

*** = statistically significant at the 1% level.
**= statistically significant at the 5% level.
*= statistically significant at the 10% level.
a

A standard t-test is used to test for a significant difference in means between year –1
and year +2. A Wilcoxon Sum Rank test is used to test for a significant difference in
medians between year –1 and year +2. The samples are tested for unequal variances and
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then the appropriate standard t-test or Satterthwaite adjusted t-test is used depending on
the outcome of the test for unequal variances.
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Table 6: Investors that Continue to Hold a 5% Block after the Initial Acquisition for a
Sample of 156 blocks for 92 firms from 1989-1990 (medians reported in parenthesis).
Listed on Proxy
Listed on Proxy
TOTAL
Statement in year +1 Statement in year +2
All Block
Acquisitions

73
(46%)

45
(28%)

156

Active Investors:
(n=67)

37*** a
(55%)

19* a
(28%)

67

Financial
Investors:
(n=48)

12
(25%)

9
(18%)

48

Strategic
Investors:
(n=41)

24
(58%)

17
(41%)

41

*** = statistically significant at the 1% level.
**= statistically significant at the 5% level.
*= statistically significant at the 10% level.
a

A chi-square test is used to test for a significant difference in the frequency of type of
investors continued to be listed on the proxy statement for year +1 and for year +2.
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Table 7: Changes in CEO Compensation and Board Characteristics for Investors that
Continue to Hold a 5% Block after the Initial Acquisition for a Sample of 156 blocks for
92 firms from 1989-1990 (medians reported in parenthesis).
Year –1

Year +1

Total CEO Cash
Compensation as a Percentage
of Total Assets

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

Percentage of CEO Options

0.19
(0.00)

0.26
(0.14)*

Percentage of CEO Stock

7.05
(6.15)

6.54
(1.64)**

Total number of Directors

8.43
(8)

8.58
(9)

Percentage of Outside
Directors

65.11
(71.43)

62.58
(69.23)

Active Buyers:

Percentage of CEOs replaced
from prior year

43.24%***

Strategic Buyers:
Total CEO Cash
Compensation as a Percentage
of Total Assets

0.74
(0.35)

0.00 **
(0.00)

Percentage of CEO Options

0.23
(0.15)

0.79
(0.09)

Percentage of CEO Stock

4.50
(1.43)

8.66
(0.69)

Total number of Directors

7.61
(7)

7.91
(8)

Percentage of Outside
Directors

47.38
(50)

60.62**
(58.33)**

Percentage of CEOs replaced
from prior year

29.17%

36
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1569-3732(04)09004-8). Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

*** = statistically significant at the 1% level.
**= statistically significant at the 5% level.
*= statistically significant at the 10% level.
a

A standard t-test is used to test for a significant difference in means between year –1
and year +1. A Wilcoxon Sum Rank test is used to test for a significant difference in
medians between year –1 and year +1. The samples are tested for unequal variances and
then the appropriate standard t-test or Satterthwaite adjusted t-test is used depending on
the outcome of the test for unequal variances.

37
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1569-3732(04)09004-8). Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

Table 8: Likelihood that Investors that Continue to Hold a 5% Block after the Initial
Acquisition for a Sample of 156 blocks for 92 firms from 1989-1990 (p-values reported
in parenthesis).
Independent Variable

Parameter estimates from a Logistic
Regression

Blockholder is a Financial Buyer

-1.4416
(0.00)***

Blockholder is a Strategic Buyer

1.4414
(0.27)

Blockholder is an Active Buyer

0.00518
(0.99)

EBITDA/ Total Assets Year -1

4.0861
(0.04)**

Total Assets
(millions $) Year -1

0.00019
(0.58)

Total CEO Cash Compensation as a
Percentage of Total Assets Year -1

191.3
(0.13)

Percentage of CEO Options Year -1

-0.4584
(0.29)

Percentage of CEO Stock Year -1

0.1440
(0.01)***

Total number of Directors Year -1

-0.1091
(0.17)

Percentage of Outside Directors Year -1

-0.0163
(0.43)

CEO Change from Previous Year in Year
+1

0.7175
(0.13)

EBITDA/ Total Assets Year +1

-2.4133
(0.25)

Total Assets
(millions $) Year +1

-0.00023
(0.53)
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Total CEO Cash Compensation as a
Percentage of Total Assets Year +1

-224.9
(0.06)**

Percentage of CEO Options Year +1

1.1298
(0.02)**

Percentage of CEO Stock Year +1

-0.1463
(0.01)***

Total number of Directors Year +1

-0.0341
(0.72)

Percentage of Outside Directors Year +1

0.0120
(0.52)

p-value for significance of regression

0.00

*** = statistically significant at the 1% level.
**= statistically significant at the 5% level.
*= statistically significant at the 10% level.
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